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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
vs. 
TRUSTEES, INC., and JEAN C. CRAN-
MER, THOMAS D. BRADEN, and 
EDWARD G. KNOWLES, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Preliminary Statement 
Case No. 87 62 
--
This appeal is from a declaratory judgment in favor 
of the defendants and against the plaintiff entered in the 
District Court, Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, 
Utah on October 24, 1957 (R. 88-89) upon written findings 
of fact and conclusions of law (R. 81-87). 
The action was commenced September 28, 1955 by the 
filing of the complaint with the clerk of the District Court, 
Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County, Utah (R.1-16). 
The plaintiff-appellant is Union Pacific Railroad 
Company, a Utah railroad corporation. The defendants-
respondents are Trustees, Inc., a Delaware corporation, 
and Jean C. Cranmer, Thomas D. Braden and Edward G. 
Knowles, individuals, who were at all times pertinent to 
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2 
this case owners of shares of stock of Union Pacific Rail-
road Company. 
The complaint set forth a cause of action under and 
pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment statutes of the 
State of Utah, Section 78-33-1 et seq.; Utah Code Anno., 
1953 (R. 1-16). The action was commenced to clarify the 
corporate power of the appellant to grant and contribute 
a sum to Union Pacific Railroad F'oundation and to make 
co~t~~butions and donations for the public welfare, or for 
charitable, scientific, religious or educational purposes. 
The question at issue arose by reason of claims and 
demands of the respondents denying such power (R. 24, 
43-46). The complaint asserted that such donations or 
contributions of corporate.funds were within the implied 
powers of the appellant corporation, and lawful and 
proper in every respect, and in addition were specifically 
authorized under Section 16-2-14(8) Utah Code Anno. 
(1955 Pk. Supp.) (R. 4). The answer denied that the 
donation or contribution of corporate funds described in 
the complaint was within the implied or statutory powers 
of the appellant corporation and claimed such action to 
be ultra vires and void (R. 19). 
The Court below based its determination that the 
defendants-respondents were entitled to the declaratory 
judgment herein appealed from, upon the following con-
clusions of law (R. 85-87): 
1. The Board of Directors of the appellant in 
making a contribution to Union Pacific Railroad 
Foundation acted beyond the express or implied 
powers of the corporation, and the making of con-
tributions for charitable, scientific, religious or edu-
ca tiona! purposes would similarly be beyond the 
express or implied powers of the corporation. 
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2. The statutory grant of corporate power to 
engage in philanthropy embodied in Section 16-2-14 
(8) Utah Code Anno. (1955 Pk. Supp.) does not 
apply to the appellant so as to authorize the con-
tribution to Union Pacific Railroad Foundation or 
similar charitable contributions. 
3. The addition of the statutory power to donate 
to the powers of the appellant corporation would 
constitute a fundamental change in the shareholders' 
contracts embodied in the appellant's Articles of 
Association. 
4. The application to the appellant of the statu-
tory power to donate would constitute an impairment 
of the obligation of the shareholders' contracts in 
violation of the contracts clauses of both the Federal 
Constitution and the Constitution of Utah. 
5. The application to the appellant of the statu-
tory power to donate would constitute a violation of 
the due process clauses of both the Federal Constitu-
tion and the Constitution of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant was incorporated on July 1, 1897, 
under an Act providing for the formation of railroad 
corporations, approved January 22, 1897 as supple-
mented and amended (R. 82). It was formed for the 
purpose of operating and maintaining a railroad, and was 
vested with the powers necessary for such purpose, as 
well as all the rights, privileges and franchises of rail-
road corporations organized under the laws of the State 
of Utah (R. 26). 
The appellant's business is the transportation of 
freight and passengers by rail and activities incident 
thereto. The appellant operates a:Pproximately 10,000 
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miles of road, running through thirteen states, employs 
about 50,000 persons and its net income before Federal 
Income Taxes for the year 1955 was $119,527,256 (R. 82). 
On May 13, 1955, members of the Board of Directors 
of the appellant corporation organized the Union Pacific 
Railroad Foundation as a non-profit corporation under 
Section 16-6-1 et seq., Utah Code Anno., 1953 (R. 83). 
The Foundation was organized for the objects and pur-
poses of exclusively engaging in, assisting, contributing 
to the support of, creating and maintaining exclusive]y 
charitable, educational and scientific activities, projects, 
institutions, organizations and funds of any and every 
kind. (Ibid.) Only individuals who are directors of 
the appellant corporation (or a subsidiary or affiliate) are 
eligible to become members of the Foundation (R. 34). 
In the event that any member should cease to be a direc-
tor his membership in the Foundation ceases forthwith 
(R. 35). The management of the affairs of the Founda-
tion is vested in a Board of Trustees of whom a majority 
must at all times be members of the Foundation (R. 36). 
The Foundation was organized by the appellant as a 
medium through which its philanthropic activities would 
be conducted (R. 83), and it is at all times subject to the 
control of those directors of the appellant who have been 
elected to the Board of Trustees by their fellow directors 
(R. 64). This right in the membership to elect the Board 
of Trustees further subjects the Foundation to the con-
trol of the appellant, who may exercise additional con-
trol through its power to disburse funds to the Founda-
tion (R. 64-65). 
The advantages, of giving through a company-spon-
sored foundation rather than directly, sought by the 
Board of Directors of the appellant corporation in 
establishing the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation as 
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a medium for its philanthropy, included improved admin-
istration of a program of giving and the permitted 
reasonable accumulation of funds in years of high profit 
which might be drawn upon in years of low profit, thus 
levelling out fluctuation in giving and facilitating a 
systematic and deliberate planning of grants (R. 83, 
Sinclair Dep. p. 29). 
On May 26, 1955, the appellant's Directors adopted 
a resolution authorizing a contribution of $5,000 to the 
Union Pacific Railroad Foundation (R. 83). On June 30, 
1955, the Foundation's Board of Trustees adopted a 
resolution authorizing a contribution of $4,000 to Brig-
ham Young University, to be applied one-half to the 
University's building program and one-half to current 
income needs (R. 83). Brigham Young University is a 
Utah non-profit corporation, control of which is vested 
in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. The 
University is devoted exclusively to educational and 
religious purposes ( R. 24). 
The history of the eleemosynary activities of the 
appellant corporation covers a span of more than fifty 
years. Mr. E. Roland Harriman, Chairman of the appel-
lant's Board of Directors and Chairman of the American 
National Red Cross under appointment by the President 
of the United States, testified at the trial that charitable 
giving by the appellant can be traced to as early as 1906 
(R. 56). At the time of the San Francisco earthquake, 
the appellant shipped into the stricken area some 1,600 
carloads of food and building materials free of charge. 
In addition to turning over stores and supplies to relief 
authorities, the appellant donated the cash sum of 
$200,000 for general relief work and moved some 224,000 
passengers out of the stricken area free of charge (Ibid.). 
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There has been a marked upward trend in corporate 
philanthropy in the United States since 1940* (Watson· 
Dep. p. 10). In 1940, donations for charitable purposes 
by corporations were in the neighborhood of $40 million. 
Since that year corporate giving has continued to rise, 
the Statistics of Income published by the Federal Govern-
ment indicating aggregate contributions for the year 
1951 to be $341 million and estimates of the current total 
to be above $500 million annually (Ibid.). On the average, 
corporations throughout the United States donate 
between .8 and .9 of 1% of their net income before taxes 
to charity (Id. at p. 14). 
This growth in corporate donations since 1940 was 
occasioned in the first instance by the needs of charities 
during World War II and thereafter by the continued 
expansion of the activities and needs of health and wel-
fare organizations (R. 55). At the trial ~fr. Harriman tes-
tified that currently some 30 to 40 percent of the income 
of the National Red Cross and similar organizations as 
well as the Community Chest are derived from corpora-
tions (Ibid.). In the case of the National Red Cross, the 
remaining percentage of the $85 million received during 
the year 1955 came from individuals, employee groups, 
foundations, women's groups, church groups and the like 
(Sinclair Dep. p. 23). The recipients of corporate phil-
anthropy include educational institutions, primarily 
colleges and universities, community institutions, such 
• For a general discussion of the background, le!!al aspects 
and growth of corporate giving in the United States, see: 
Andrews. Corporat?·on G1'm'nq, pp. 229-244 (RnsselJ Sag-e Foun-
dation, l!J;)2) : Bell, Corpm·at?'on Support of Educatinn. 38 
ABAJ l 19 (1952) ; Bleicken, Corporate Contrt:buNons to Char?·-
ties, 38 ABAJ 999 (1952) ; and de Capriles ann Garrett Corpo-
rate Support to Education, 38 ABAJ 209 (1952). ' 
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as united funds and community chests, and local institu-
tions, such as hospitals, cultural and civic groups (W at-
son Dep. pp. 18-19; See also, Ex. 3 to Sinclair Dep. p. 
7). 
The growth in recent years of corporate aid to educa-
tion has been in response to the needs occasioned by the 
financial crisis facing private higher education in the 
United States (Lincoln Dep., p. 7; E~. 4 to Sinclair Dep., 
pp. 3-6). The critical needs of American colleges and 
universities are due to several factors, including the 
impact of taxation upon funds of individuals available 
for donations and endowments, continued increases in 
student enrollment, disparity between tuition and cost 
per student, decline of relative importance of endowment 
income and continued increases in operating expenses and 
capital expenditures (Ex. 4 to Sinclair Dep., pp. 3-6 and 
Ex. 1 to Lincoln Dep., pp. 4-7 ; see also, Mullendore Dep., 
p. 5). Corporate giving is one of the principal sources 
of adequate support available to private higher educa-
tion (Ex. 1 to Lincoln Dep., pp. 8-11). Large private 
gifts and contributions to endowment have become, 
because of high taxBs, almost non-existent and the same 
is true of the private foundation. Funds from alumni and 
friends are pitifully inadequate and financial support 
from government, the remaining source, constitutes a 
threat to the independence of the beneficiary institutions 
(Ibid.). 
The purpose of the appellant corporation in organ-
izing the Union Pacific Railroad Foundation as a medium 
through which its philanthropic activities would be con-
ducted (R. 83) was to initiate a program under which 
the corporation, through its Board of Directors in the 
exercise of their collective prudent business judgment, 
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8 
would (i) assume its reasonable share of the cost of pre-
serving a favorable economic and social environment, 
within the framework of the free enterprise system, and 
in which the corporation may continue to prosper to its 
benefit and the ultimate benefit of its shareholders and, 
(ii) assume its reasonable and rightful share of the social 
responsibilities of both individual and corporate citizens 
of the community to preserve and maintain our economic 
and social order (R. 60-61, Mullendore Dep., pp. 6-8 and 
Sinclair Dep., pp. 8-10). 
At the trial Mr. Harriman expressed his opinion as 
Chairman of the Board of the appellant, as to the reason-
able distribution of corporate funds for the above pur-
poses in the following language: 
Well, I think it is good business to do so; in 
the long run, beneficial to our stockholders. The 
very continuance of our public service corporation 
depends upon the growth of our communities that 
we serve, and the healthy environment in which 
those communities operate. 
If the communities were not there, we certainly 
would not be able to serve them, and in a like man-
ner, if they are not in a good condition, mentally, 
morally and physically, they would not be as good 
customers. We really believe the existence of this 
atmosphere of healthy environment I speak of, is 
as much of a must in the maintenance of it by our 
company as the maintenance of our :>hysical prop-
erty, using reasonable judgment throughout. 
Secondly, we think we can increase t:nd main-
tain the goodwill in those communities. As I said, 
I think that the public has come to expect thr...t we 
will support worthwhile local and national causes, 
and, in effect, we agree with this viewpoint 
(R. 60-61). 
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Another Director of the appellant corporation, John 
S. Sinclair• testified as follows with respect to the basis 
for his belief that the corporation should expand its sup-
port of educational and welfare institutions: 
Now, as we know, each individual has cer-
tain responsibilities toward his fellowmen, some 
imposed by law, others imposed by his own con-
science or by the influence of public or community 
opinion. A corporation is not much different in 
these respects. . .. it is given a corporate per-
sonality by law and is treated as a legal entity, 
and the general public thinks of it as something 
separate and apart from its shareholders and its 
employees and its management, which mer.ns that 
the corporation has a good name, or a bad or 
uncertain name in the public eye or the community 
estimation, it incurs either goodwill or illwill in 
communities where it operates and which it serves. 
The studies that we have issued, which have 
been referred to, indicate that the public has come 
to expect that corporations shall act like respon-
sible human members of society; that is, that they 
will contribute to worthy causes to strengthen and 
stabilize our economic and social structure. 
Now, this does not mean that the people expect 
corporations to dissipate the shareholders' assets 
by unwise or foolish largesse. Such activity, of 
• Mr. Sinclair is President of the National Industrial Con-
ference Board, a research and educational institution for the 
study of the economic and administrative problems of American 
business. It assembles and disseminates to industry, labor, g-ov-
ernment, educators and the public facts on business organi'Zation 
and operation and on the national economy (Ex. 6 to Watson 
Dep.). The National Industrial Conference Board numbers 
amon~ its membership over 3,000 of the foremost American cor-
porations and educational and other institutions, including 
Anaconda Copper Mining Company, Kennecott Copper Corpo-
ration the Utah Construction Company, Utah Power and Light Comp~ny and the Utah State Agricultural College (ld., See, 
list following p. 107). 
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course, would bring prompt intervention by the 
courts at the instance of complaining share-
holders. What I really mean is that we have come 
to expect corporations to behave in the field of 
social consciousness as individuals would behave 
-that is, with a prudent eye to its financial capac-
ity and selectivity as to the objects of its gener-
osity. I do not mean by this that corporations 
should give only where a measurable or direct 
tangible benefit is purchased with the so-called 
donation. The community does not expect that indi-
viduals shall give on any such basis, and corpora-
tions should not be so limited. 
In my view, it is not good business to disappoint 
the public expectation I have described. Corporate 
donations create good will in the community. In 
many instances, assistance to private institutions 
will help reduce the burden on public institutions, 
and thus on the public purse and the extent of 
taxation for that purpose. 
For example, I have no doubt that support for 
the Boy Scouts will help in a given community to 
reduce juvenile delinquency, and help to the Red 
Cross assists in the performance of many quasi-
public functions which otherwise would have to be 
assumed by government. Assistance to private 
educational institutions of higher learning will 
help to create a pool of highly-trained and edu-
cated persons from which the future management 
of business corporations must be chosen. 
I would not, however, want to base my theory 
of corporate support of education solely on the 
direct benefits to corporations from a pool of 
trained manpower. In my view, assistance to edu-
cation will result in national benefits to our society 
as a whole-benefits of an ethical, moral, and 
spiritual nature-and that is why I favor such 
support. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
Furthermore, I have also believed that if our 
young people are educated, they will freely choose 
our system of competitive enterprise over any 
competing system. The hope. of America lies in 
knowledge, not in ignorance (Sinclair Dep., pp. 
8-10). 
William C. Mullendore, Chairman of the Board of 
Southern California Edison Corporation, testified as a 
Director of the appellant corporation with respect to the 
obligation of corporations to support educational and 
charitable institutions, and benefits accruing to them from 
such support, as follows: 
The basis of our policy of making contributions 
in aid of the work and in support of educational 
and charitable institutions is, of course, first of all, 
as a citizen of the community dependent upon the 
goodwill of the customers. In considering the 
goodwill as an important part of our assets, we 
find a real need for playing our part in the com-
munity. That relates particularly to charitable 
contributions. 
In educational matters, we believe that one of 
the primary duties of the Board of Directors and 
management of a corporation is to preserve the 
institution. It is just as much our duty to help 
preserve the basic principles upon which our public 
service enterprise depends for its continued exist-
ence within the framework of a free enterprise 
system, as it is to preserve the physical equipment 
against the physical elements, normal wear and 
tear and depreciation. 
We recognize that in a free society the rights 
of the citizen are dependent upon the discharge of 
his obligations, and that if the free citizens fail 
to help preserve their free institutions through the 
education and training and passing on of our tradi-
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tions of a free country to the youth, those institu-
tions would be undermined by the inadequacy and 
lack of understanding and ignorance of the citizens. 
It is therefore on that general line of reasoning 
that we feel that it is just as much the obligation 
of the corporate management to use some of its 
resources in helping to educate the youth of a 
country and of our community in the principles 
and traditions of our free institutions, as it is to 
use our resources in the construction and main-
tenance of our physical equipment. 
Coincidentally, we have included in our regular 
0perating expenses the provision for those dona-
tions, as necessarily included a much larger, of 
course, budget for maintenance of our physical 
equipment. In that very real sense we believe that 
it is protecting the interest of the stockholder in 
both the principal of his investment and his earn-
ings through dividends (Mullendore Dep., pp. 6-8). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The donation in question constitutes a proper 
exercise of a valid statutory corporate power embodied 
in Section 16-2-14(8) Utah Code Anno. 
a. The statutory power to make donations applies to 
pre-existing corporations. 
b. The statutory power to make donations does not 
constitute a fundamental alteration of the share-
holders' contract embodied in appellants' corpo-
rate charter. 
c. Even if the statutory addition of a corporate power 
to make donations were a fundamental change in 
the sharel1olders' contract, such change would not 
violate the Constitutional prohibitions against 
impairment of contracts. 
(1) Utah does not follow the "immutable con-
tract'' theory. 
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(2) Even if Utah followed the "immutable con-
tract" theory the statute authorizing dona-
tions is valid under the state's reserved power 
over corporate charters or under the state's 
police power. 
d. The statutory addition of a power to make dona-
tions does not infringe the due process require-
ments of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. 
II. The donation in question constitutes a proper 
exercise of an implied power possessed by Utah corpo-
rations without regard to Section 16-2-14(8) Utah Code 
Anno. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The contribution represents a valid exercise by 
the appellant corporation of a statutory power 
granted to it by Section 16-2-14 ( 8) Utah Code Anno. 
(a) The statutory power to donate is applicable to 
and was exercised by the appellant, a pre-existing cor-
poration. 
On May 10, 1955 Utah joined the ranks of thirty-eight 
sister states/ the District of Columbia and the Territory 
1 States with laws expressly granting to corporations the 
power to engage in philanthropy are the following: Arkansas, 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Citations to the 
statutes in the foregoing states, as well as the District of Colum-
bia and the Territory of Hawaii, are set forth in Appendix A. 
Nine States have no permissive legis1ation with respect to power 
to donate and are as follows: Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Iowa, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and 
Wyoming. 
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of Hawaii in expre,ssly granting to corporations of the 
State, by act of the Legislature, the power to engage in 
philanthropy. The statutory power embodied in Section 
16-2-14(8) Utah Code Anno., reads as follows: 
The corporation in its name shall have power 
• • 
(8) To make donations for the public welfare 
or for charitable, scientific, religious or educa-
tional purposes. Provided, however, that nothing 
in this section shall be construed as directly or 
indirectly affecting the restrictions on corporate 
contributions imposed by section 20-14-21, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
In empowering Utah business corporations to make 
charitable donations, the Legislature followed the model 
statute recommended by the Committee on Business Cor-
porations of the American Bar Association.2 The recom-
mendation suggested that the donative power be added 
to the section of the corporation law enumerating the 
general powers of corporations and was specific in its 
grant of a power broad in its terms and without limita-
tion as to amount. The Committee saw "no logical reason 
for prescribing a statutory yardstick for measuring the 
amount that can be donated.' '3 This recommendation 
of a power without statutory limitations or restrictions 
on the quantum of the donation is incorporated in the 
statutes of Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, 
the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, Oregon and Wisconsin. 4 
2 See, Memorandum, dated September 1, 1950, from the Com-
mittee on Business Corporations of the Section of Corporation, 
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, 
set forth in Appendix B. 
8 Ibid. 
4 See, Appendix A. 
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It should be clearly understood that the absence of 
any limitation in the Utah statute as to the amount of 
donations permitted does not furnish any proper ground 
for objection to the statute. The donative power, like 
all other corporate powers, must be exercised by the 
directors in accordance with sound business judgment. 
An improper exercise of this power would be subject to 
judicial restraint and personal liability as in the case of 
all improper actions by the board of directors. The idea 
that a statutory statement of the power of Utah corpora-
tions to ~make donations constitutes a license in the board 
of directors to give away all the assets of the corporation 
is obviously without merit. Each and every exercise of 
the donative power is subject to the rule of "reasonable 
business judgment"5 which may be enforced either by 
a shareholder suit or by the removal of directors by vote 
of the shareholders at their annual meeting. 
In enacting the donative power provision, the Utah 
legislature has declared the public policy of the state to 
favor donations by Utah corporations for eleemosynary 
purposes. This declaration of policy was expressly noted 
at the trial by Attorney General Callister, when he 
stated: 
... it is our position the statute is constitu-
tional, and the Legislature by enacting Chapter 
22, Laws of '55, has declared the policy of the 
State of Utah in favor of permitting corporations 
to make charitable donations ... (R. 50) 
The appellant is a Utah railroad corporation and as 
such has been vested by the Legislature with all of the 
powers of Utah business corporations including the 
recently-enacted power to donate. 
5 See, Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 7, Sec. 3453 
(Perm. Ed.). 
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As stated above, the appellant was incorporated on 
July 1, 1897 under an Act providing for the formation 
of railroad corporations approved January 22, 1897, as 
supplemented and amended.6 Under this Act, railroad 
companies were granted certain express powers and were 
granted additional powers as follows: 
Such corporations shall in addition to the fore-
going powers be vested with and be entitled to 
exercise and enjoy all powers, rights, privileges 
and franchises which at the time of the sale 
belonged to or were vested in the corporation or 
corporations last owning the property sold, as well 
as all the rights, privileges and franchises of rail-
road corporations organized under the laws of this 
State •.. (Emphasis supplied.) 
At the time of the appellant's organization, the Utah 
Constitution, which became operative on January 4, 
18967 contained the reserved power provision found in 
Article XII, Section 1, whereby ''All laws relating to 
corporations may be altered, amended or repealed by the 
Legislature ... ".8 Accordingly, the Act under which 
the appellant was organized gTanted to it all the rights, 
privileges and franchises of Utah railroad corporations 
and, by reason of its reserved power, the state retained 
the right to alter, amend or repeal the powers so granted 
to it. 
In 1901, the statutes relating to Utah railroad cor-
porations were revised and codified to provide that all 
such corporations, regardless of when organized, should 
possess all of the powers and privileges conferred by the 
6 L. 1897, Ch. 1, p. 13. 
7 See, 1 Utah Code Anno., 1953, pp. 309, 311. 
s I d. at p. 259. 
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newly enacted railroad law.9 The present counterpart 
of such provision states that :10 
Railroad corporations heretofore organized 
and now existing or hereafter organized under the 
laws of this state shall be subject to all the duties 
imposed and shall have and possess all the powers 
and privileges conferred by this title, as well as tbe 
powers and privileges conferred by the laws under 
which said corporations were organized or which 
are contained in their articles of incorporation and 
are not inconsistent with the laws and Constitu-
tion of this state. (Emphasis supplied.) 
In 1907, by amendment to the railroad law, every 
Utah railroad corporation, regardless of when organized, 
was granted all the powers of corporations organized 
for pecuniary profit.11 The present counterpart of such 
grant provides that :12 
Every railroad corporation organized under 
the laws of this state shall, except as otherwise 
provided in this title and subject to the limitations 
and requirements hereof, have all the rights, privi-
leges and powers, and be subject to all the duties 
and obligations, of corporations organized for 
pecuniary profit . . . (Emphasis supplied.) 
The foregoing provisions of the Utah railroad law 
were of course in force in 1945 when the appellant's 
corporate life was extended by amendment to its articles 
of association13 and they thus form a part of the contract 
9 L. 1901, Ch. 26, Sec. 8, p. 24. 
10 Section 56-1-1, Utah Code Anno., 1953. 
11 C. L. 1907, Sees. 433 and 434. 
12 Section 56-1-5, Utah Code Anno., 1953. 
13 See, Sixth Amendment to appellant's Article of Associa-
tion, R. following p. 26. 
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between the appellant and its stockholders embodied in 
such articles.14 
In enacting the recent grant of power to donate, the 
Utah Legislature clearly intended, as a matter of statu-
tory construction, that the power should apply to corpo-
rations organized prior to the effective date of the statute 
as . well as those organized thereafter. . This is readily 
demonstrated from the unambiguous language of the 
applicable statutory provisions. 
The donative power was enacted by the U tab Legis-
lature as paragraph (8) to Section 16-2-14, Utah Code 
Anno. wherein the powers of corporations for pecuniary 
profit are enumerated. Section 16-2-14 begins with the 
phrase ''The corporation under its name shall have 
power:" (emphasis supplied) and then proceeds to spec-
ify the powers granted. The phrase ''The corporation'' 
as used in such Section means all corporations for pecu-
niary profit regardless of when incorporated, for Section 
16-2-2, Utah Code Anno., 1953, reads as follows: 
Unless otherwise provided in any title of these 
statutes, the provisions of this chapter shall 
apply to all private corporations organized under 
the laws of this state. (Emphasis supplied.) 
It should be clearly understood that the question which 
is the subject of this section of the brief is merely one 
of statutory construction, i. e., putting to one side ques-
tions of Constitutional significance, did the Legislature 
intend to exercise the state's reserYed power so as to 
make available to pre-existing corporations the statu-
tory power to donate. That it has chosen to do so is 
beyond question. It is of course for this Court and not 
for the Legislature to resolve the question of whether, 
14 See, Fowler, et al. v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co. 
et aZ., 99 Utah 267 (1940), cert. denied 313 U. S. 564 (1941). 
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as so applied, the statute is violative of any of the 
respondents' Federal and State Constitutional rights. 
These questions are discussed in following sections of 
the brief . 
. In its :findings of fact, the court below held that it did 
not appear from the language of the donative power 
amendment that the Legislature intended the enactment 
to have retrospective application.15 If by "retrospective 
application" the court meant application to a pre-
existing corporation, the :finding is clearly erroneous and 
is contrary to the express language of the Legislature as 
demonstrated hereinabove. Moreover if by '' retrospec-
tive application" the court below meant application of 
the donative power to validate a contribution made prior 
to. the effective date thereof, the holding is equally erro-
neous. The facts of this case do not call for any such 
"retrospective application" since the donation by the 
appellant corporation was indisputably made after the 
effective date of the statutory power to donate. The 
effective date of the legislation in question was May 10, 
1955.16 The Union Pacific Railroad Foundation, the recip-
ient of the donation, was organized three days later, i.e., 
on May 13, 1955, as a Utah non-profit corporation.17 The 
resolution of the appellant's Board of Directors, granting 
and contributing the sum in question to the Union Pacific 
Railroad Foundation, was adopted sixteen days after the 
effective date of the legislation, i.e., on May 26, 1955.18 
In McCarrey v. Utah State Teachers' Ret. Board, 
. et al., 111 Utah 251 (1947), this Court passed on the ques-
tion of whether a teacher who had retired and had ceased 
15 R. 85. 
16 L. 1955, Ch. 22, p. 39. 
17 R. 83. 
18 Ibid. 
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to be a member of the State Teachers' Retirement System 
in 1943, a time when teachers' retirement benefits were 
based on years of service in the public schools only, 
was entitled to benefit from a 1945 amendment to the 
Teachers' Retirement Act which purported to extend the 
benefits of the retirement system to certain non-public 
school teachers. The court rejected the plaintiff's con-
tention that she was entitled to such extended benefits 
and held that the 1945 amendment should not be so con-
strued as to operate retrospectively "to persons who had 
retired and who were no longer members of the public 
school system when the amendment became effective" 
(Id. at p. 254). The decision might conceivably have 
some bearing on the question of whether the statutory 
power operates to validate retrospectively a corporate 
donation made prior to the effective date of the legisla-
tion. However, as noted above, such question is not pre-
sented in the case at bar. 
The court below made reference in its findings to the 
fact that the evidence in tL.e case did not show that any 
shareholders' action had been taken authorizing the dona-
tion by the appellant to the Union Pacific Railroad Foun-
da tion.19 There was in fact no such action by share-
holders and none was required since the Corporation 
Code specifically provides that the ''corporate powers 
of the corporation shall be exercised by the Board of 
Directors". 20 The phrase "corporate powers" includes 
those set forth in the statutory grant of general powers 
(among which is the power to donate), as well as powers 
implied at common law and on which appellant also 
relies to sustain its power to make the contribution at bar. 
As noted in the Statement of Facts, this action arose 
out of a contribution made by the appellant to the Union 
10 R. 85. 
20 Section 16-2-21, Utah Code Anno., 1953. 
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Pacific Railroad Foundation, a charitable foundation 
organized and sponsored by the appellant as a mediam 
through which its program of giving might be conducted. 
The Foundation in turn made a contribution of funds 
received from the appellant to Brigham Young U niver-
sity. The Foundation was organized as a Utah non-
profit corporation, and is limited under its affidavit of 
organization to: 
... the objects and purposes of exclusively 
engaging in, assisting and contributing to the sup-
port of exclusively charitable, educational and 
scientific activities and projects and contributing 
to the support of and the creation and maintenance 
of exclusively charitable, educational and scientific 
institutions, organizations and funds of any and 
every kind . . . ( R. 31) 
It is hardly subject to question that a contribution to 
a donee whose objects and purposes are thus limited to 
eleemosynary activities constitutes the exercise of the 
statutory power to engage in philanthropy. 
(b) The application to the appellant corporation of 
the statutory power to donate does not constitute a funda-
mental change in the shareholders' contracts embodied 
in the appellant's charter. Thus, no Constitutional objec-
tions on the theory of impairment of contract can be 
raised by the respondents. 
The charter of a corporation is generally regarded 
as a tri-partite contract: first, a contract between the 
state and the corporation, second, between the corpora-
tion and its shareholders, and third, between the share-
holders inter se.21 The plural nature of the contracts 
embodied in the charter of Utah corporations was recog-
nized by this Court fifty years ago and formed the basis 
21 See, Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations Vol. 7, Sec. 3657 
(Perm. Ed.). 
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for its holding in Garey v. Mining Co.,22 hereinafter dis-
cussed. 
In Dartmouth College v. W oodward23 the United 
States Supreme Court held that a corporate charter was 
a contract and as such entitled to protection under the 
provision of the Federal Constitution prohibiting any 
state from enacting a law impairing the obligation of a 
contract.24 After the Dartmouth College case, it was 
recognized that a state legislature might not, without 
the consent of the corporation, alter or amend the charter, 
unless it specifically reserved the right to do so in its 
grant to the corporation. The general practice quickly 
arose, pursuant to Mr. Justice Story's suggestion in the 
Dartmouth College concurring opinion, on the part of the 
several states to reserve to the State, in the grant of 
corporate charters, the right to alter, amend or repeal 
the laws governing corporations. As has been noted 
previously, the Utah Constitution contained such 
reserved power at the time of the organization of the 
appellant corporation. 
At the time of the Dartmouth College decision, and 
the passage of the legislation that case initiated, the 
plural contractual nature of the corporate charter had 
not been clearly developed in the case law. The question 
has since been raised as to whether the typical reserved 
power clause was enacted merely to avoid the rule of 
the Dartmouth College case, i. e., to enable the State to 
do what that case prohibited, to wit, effect a fundamental 
change which in the absence of the reserved power would 
constitute an impairment of the contract between the 
state and the corporation, or whether, on the other hand, 
22 32 Utah 497, 505 (1907). 
2s 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S., 1819). 
24 U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 10, Cl. 1; See also, Utah Const., 
Art. .I, Sec. 18. 
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the reserved power should be construed broadly so as 
to .. p.ermit what ~ould. otb.erwise constitute 'impairment 
of the corporation-shareholder contracts ~nd the con-
tracts between the sh~reholders inter se. Under the 
so-called Massachusetts rule, the latter interpretation pre-
vails.25 However, under the theory of immutable contract, 
the reserved power was held to apply only to the contract 
between the State and the corporation.26 
It is important to note that the immutable contract 
theory was originated in the courts of the State of New 
Jersey; however, the highest court in that State has 
recently expressly refused to apply the theory so as to 
prevent the application of a statutory power to donate 
to a pre-existing corporation.27 At any rate, the neces-
sity of examining the scope of the state's reserved power 
does not arise at all, unless the statutory power to donate 
may be said to effect fundamental change in the corpo-
rate charter, as distinguished from a change which is 
merely incidental, such as a change made pursuant to the 
specific terms of the original "charter-contract". At the 
outset it should be understood that if a fundamental 
change in the charter of a Utah corporation is to be effec-
tive, unanimous consent of shareholders is required 
regardless of whether the change is accomplished either 
by means of a statutory amendment to the laws govern-
ing corporations or by means of an amendment by the 
shareholders to the certificate of incorporation. As a 
leading textwriter put it :28 
25 Durfre v. Olil Colonu and Fall River Railroad Company & 
Others, 87 Mass. 230 (1862). 
26 7nhri.'lk?'e v. TT"'· Hnr-7te'J?Mr-k and New York Railroad Com-
pam!. 18 N. J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867). 
27 A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow. 26 N. J. S11pPr. 
JOn ~7 A. 2d JR6 (1953). nff'd. 18 N . .T. ~ 14fl. 98 A. 2rl 581 
(1953), appeal dismis~ed 346 U. S. Sol (1953). The A. P. Smith 
case is hereinafter discussed at length. 
2s Fletr,her Cuclopedia Corporations, Vol. 7, Sec. 3684, pp. 
840.R4.1 fPAMn. Ed.). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
A change in fundamentals is an. amendment, 
whether it is called such or not and whether made 
by the legislature directly or by the corporation 
itself by legislative authorization. A material and 
fundamental change in the charter by an amend-
ment to that charter is an unconstitutional viola-
tion of the contract rights of any shareholder who 
does not consent to such an amendment. 
That the statutory power to donate does not consti-
tute a change in fundamentals, but represents a mere 
incidental change in the appellant's charter may be 
demonstrated from the fact that it could have been 
engrafted on the appellant's charter by shareholder 
amendment rather than by legislative amendment and 
in such case unanimous consent of shareholders would 
not have been required. 
The Articles of Association of the appellant corpora-
tion contained the following provision at the time of its 
incorporation, which provision has remained operative 
to date :29 
... It may also from time to time amend these 
Articles of Association by filing amended Articles 
of Association, increasing the capital stock, or 
otherwise, agreeably with law. enlarging or chang-
ing the powers of the corporation hereby formed ... 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
In addition to the fact that the appellant's Articles 
of Association specifically authorize additions to or 
changes in the powers of the corporation, the Utah Cor-
poration Code specifically authorizes shareholder amend-
ments to the Articles by adding to the purposes of the 
corporation by a mere majority vote in the absence of a 
specific charter provision. (The appellant's .A.rticles are 
20 See, Article 8 of appellant's Articles of Association, R. fol-
lowing p. 26. 
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silent as to the vote required for a shareholders' amend-
ment.) 
The statute reads in part as follows :80 
The articles of incorporation of any corpora-
tion now existing or that hereafter may be organ-
ized under the laws of this state may be amended 
in any respect conformable to the laws of this state 
in such manner and by the vote of such proportion 
of all or any class or classes of stock as the articles 
of incorporation may provide; and in case the arti-
cles of incorporation do not so provide, by a vote 
representing at least a majority in amount of the 
outstanding stock thereof entitled to vote at a 
stockholders' meeting called for that purpose as 
prescribed in section 16-2-49; provided, that, if all 
the stockholders entitled to vote, vote in favor of 
such amendment at any meeting of the stock-
holders, the notice required by section 16-2-49 need 
not be given; and provided further, that the orig-
inal purpose of the corporation shall not be altered 
or changed without the approval and consent of all 
the outstanding stock, but the adding to the pur-
poses or object or extending the power and busi-
ness of the corporation shall not be deemed a 
chan.qe of the or·iginal purpose of the corporation 
. . . (Emphasis supplied.) 
The predecessor to this Section was construed by 
this Court in Fowler et al. v. Provo Bench Canal & Irri-
gation Co. et al.81 It was therein held that an amendment 
empowering an irrigation corporation ''to purchase stock 
in other corporations, to purchase dams, canals etc. and 
to assess its own capital stock"32 was not a material and 
fundamental change which altered the original purpose 
so Section 16-2-45, Utah Code Anno., 1953. 
at 99 Utah 267 (1940), cert. denied 313 U. S. 564 (1941). 
82 ld. at 272. 
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of the corporation, and which would require unanimous 
shareholder consent. 
The holding was as follows :33 
... Defendant corporation is engaged in the 
business of supplying irrigating water to its stock-
holders. . .. The amendments which we are con-
sidering empower the corporation to acquire addi-
tional facilities for diverting and transmitting 
irrigation water, to enter into contracts to acquire 
water rights, to encumber its property to pay its 
debts, to purchase stock in other corporations, to 
purchase its own stock and to assess its own stock 
for any and all corporate purposes. In other words, 
the corporation is enabled by virtue of such amend-
ments, to secure for distribution to its stockholders 
irrigating water diverted into Provo River under 
the Deer Creek Project. This change seems to be 
not only consistent with the original corporate 
purpose but a logical extension or growth which 
might have been expected in the corporate activity. 
We hold such amendments to be in conformity 
with Section 18-2-44, R. S. U. 1933, which reads 
in part: 
' ... the adding to the purposes or object or 
extending the power and business of the cor-
poration shall not be deemed a change of the 
original purpose of the corporation ... ' 
That the water is diverted from another water-
shed into Provo River before it is withdrawn by 
defendant is no basis for holding that the water 
is not conveyed 'from Provo River to Provo Bench 
and lands adjacent thereto.' To us it appears 
tha.t said arnendrrtents do not fundamentally change 
the purpose of the corporation, but rather, they 
represent a natural and foreseeable development 
of the business of the corporation in furtherance 
of its purpose. As more land is cultivated and 
ss I d. at 273-274. 
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the demand for irrigating water increases, as 
engineering science and study develop methods of 
preserving more of the run-off of water in our 
mountains and of transmitting and utilizing it for 
irrigation, and as capital becomes available to 
execute these projects, it is logical and proper that 
the business of existing irrigation corporations be 
expanded to secure and distribute the additional 
water. (Emphasis supplied.) 
In Salt Lake .Automobile Co. v. Keith O'Brien Co. et 
al., 45 Utah 218 (1914) this Court rejected the claim by 
dissenting holders of existing preferred stock in the 
corporation that their Constitutional rights were invaded 
by an amendment to the charter which was adopted by 
a majority vote, pursuant to statutory authorization, and 
which authorized the issuance of a new preferred stock 
with preferential rights. The court did not hold the 
amendment to represent a fundamental change in the 
preferred shareholder's contract so as to give rise to an 
invasion of such Constitutional right. 
The appellant submits that under the provision of its 
Articles of Association authorizing extensions of the 
powers of the corporation, the specific language of the 
Utah statutes authorizing shareholder amendments to 
add to the purposes of the corporation, and the prior 
determinations of this Court, the power to donate, which 
has been added to the appellant's charter by legislative 
amendment, could have been added thereto by share-
holders' amendment without the necessity for unanimous 
consent. The donative power, therefore, does not repre-
sent a "fundamental change" in the contracts of the 
respondent shareholders so as to give substance to the 
Constitutional objections_ which they have raised. 
The testimony of the appellant's witnesses, as well 
as the holdings of the New Jersey courts in .A. P. Smith 
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Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, infra, which will herein-
after be discussed, evidence the fact that the donative 
power is, under the tests laid down by this Court in 
Fowler et al. v. Provo Bench Canal&; Irrigation Co. et al., 
supra, "a logical extension or growth" and a "natural 
and foreseeable development'' in the powers of the 
modern business corporation and of its social respon-
sibilities. The appellant's witnesses, without exception, 
supported expansion of its philanthropic activities as a 
necessary concomitant to the proper conduct of its busi-
ness as a common carrier, and nowhere in the cross exami-
nation, or otherwise, is there the slightest suggestion of 
a change in the original purpose of the corporation. 
(c) Even if the application to the appellant corpora· 
tion of the statutory power to donate effects a funda-
mental change in the shareholders' contracts embodied 
in the appellant's charter, the exercise of such power does 
not constitute an impairment of the obligation of such 
shareholders' contracts. 
Even if it is assumed for purposes of the argument 
that tlie application to the appellant corporation of the 
statutory power to donate effects a fundamental change 
in the shareholders' contracts embodied in the appellant's 
charter, such application must be sustained as a valid 
exercise of the State's reserved power. In the previous 
section reference was made to the fact that United States 
courts have adopted two views with respect to the scope 
of the reserved power of a State. Under the Massa-
chusetts rule of Du,rfee v. Old Colony and Fall River Rail-
road Contpany ct Others84 it was held that the reserved 
power must be broadly construed so as to validate what, 
in the absence of such reserved power, would constitute 
impairments of any of the contracts embodied in the cor-
14 87 Mass. 230 (1862). 
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porate charter, including the shareholder-corporate con~ 
tract. On the other hand under the theory of immutable 
contract first announced by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Zabriskie v. The Hackensack and New York 
Railroad C ompany35 the reserved power was narrowly 
construed so as to apply merely to the state-corporate 
charter contract and not the corporate-shareholder con-
tract. 
Under the so-called Massachusetts rule, with respect 
to the broad scope of the state's reserved power, the 
impairment of contract objection raised by the respond-
ents must fail. It is to be noted that this Court in its 
opinion in Cowan, et al. v. Salt Lake Hardware Co.36 gave 
recent recognition to the broad scope of the Utah reserved 
power as pertaining not only to the corporate-state con-
tract but also to the corporate-shareholder contract. The 
Cowan case was an action by preferred stockholders to 
determine the right of a corporation to amend its charter 
so as to make non-callable preferred shares callable. The 
shareholders contended that the charter did not contain 
authority to amend and that the Constitutional and stat-
utory provisions permitting amendments were merely 
reservations of power protecting the relationship between 
the state and the corporation, and to be exercised only in 
matters of public concern and welfare. The court rejected 
this contention, quoting the reserved power found in the 
Utah Constitution, the statutory power to amend, and 
then made the following statement :37 
Counsel for appellants in their brief have pro-
vided this court with an interesting and learned 
treatise on the historical background of the rea-
35 18 N. J. Eq. 178 ( Ch. 1867). 
sa 118 Utah 300 ( 1950). 
aT Id. at pp. 303-304. 
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sons for the adoption by states of constitutional 
and statutory provisions similar to ours quoted 
above in order to avoid the effect of the ruling of 
the United States Supreme Court in the case of 
Trustees of D.artmouth College v. Woodward, 4 
Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629, wherein it was held that 
the charter granted by a state to a corporation was 
in the nature of a contract between the state and 
the corporation, and that the state could not impair 
its obligations, thereunder by subsequent legisla-
tion. How ever interesting this historical back-
ground is, it is now well settled that such 
constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing 
amendments of Articles of Incorporation do not 
only pertain to the relationship between the state 
and the corporation, but pertain to the rights 
between the corporation and its stockholders. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
So then, in arriving at its holding in Cowan, this 
Court specifically regarded the broad construction of 
the reserved power to be "well settled" law in Utah. 
It is submitted that the holding requires the rejection by 
this Court of the Constitutional objections raised by the 
respondents herein.38 
Even if this Court were to examine such Constitu-
tional objections in the light of a narrow construction 
of the reserved power under the immutable contract 
theory, it would be required to sustain the application 
of the donative power legislation to the appellant. The 
New Jersey Supreme Court, which itself gave :first recog-
nition to the theory, has recently refused to apply it 
so as to invalidate the application of the New Jersey 
statutory power to donate to a pre-existing corporation. 
88 See. Dvkstra, Utah CorporaNon Code, 4 Utah J.J. Rev. 439, 
452-454 ( 1955). 
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In A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow89 the New 
Jersey court passed upon the legality of a contribution 
to a private university by a corporation which had been 
organized prior to the passage of the permissive legisla-
tion. The court held that the advancement of the public 
interest which would result from corporate giving justi-
fied the invoking of the reserved power so as to sustain 
the legislation even though contractual rights of share-
holders may have been affected. With respect to its 
refusal to apply the immutable contract theory to the 
case the court stated as follows at pp. 156-157: 
The appellants contend that the foregoing New 
Jersey statutes may not be applied to corporations 
created before their passage. Fifty years before 
the incorporation of The A. P. Smith Manufactur-
ing Company our Legislature provided that every 
corporate charter thereafter granted 'shall be 
subject to alteration, suspension and repeal, in the 
discretion of the legislature.' L. 1846, p. 16; R. S. 
14:2-9. A similar reserved power was placed into 
our State Constitution in 1875 (Art. IV, Sec. VII, 
par. 11), and is found in our present Constitution. 
Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 9. In the early case of 
Zabriskie v. Hackensack and New York Railroad 
Company, 18 N. J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867), the court 
was called upon to determine whether a railroad 
could extend its line, above objection by a stock-
holder, under a legislative enactment passed upon 
the reserve power after the incorporation of the 
railroad. Notwithstanding the breadth of the 
statutory language and persuasive authority else-
where (Durfee v. Old Colony & Fall River Rail-
road Company, 87 Mass. 230 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1862) ), 
it was held that the proposed extension of the 
39 26 N.J. Super. 106, 97 A. 2d 186 (1953), aff'd, 13 N.J. 9e: 
145,98 A. 2d 581 (1953), appeal dismissed 346 U.S. 861 (1953). 
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company's line constituted a vital change of its 
corporate object which could not be accomplished 
without unanimous consent. See Lattin, A Primer 
on Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 West Res. 
L. Rev. 3, 7 (1949). The court announced the now 
familiar· New Jersey doctrine that although the 
reserved power permits alterations in the public 
interest of the contract between the state and the 
corporation, it bas no effect on the contractual 
rights between the corporation and its stockhold-
ers and between stockholders inter se. U nfortu-
nately, the court did not consider whether it was 
contrary to the public interest to permit the single 
minority stockholder before it to restrain the rail-
road's normal corporate growth and development 
as authorized by the Legislature and approved, 
reasonably and in good faith, by the corporation's 
managing directors and majority stockholders. 
Although the later cases in New Jersey have not 
disavowed the doctrine of the Zabriskie case, it is 
noteworthy that they have repeatedly recognized 
that where justified by the advancement of the 
public interest the reserved power may be invoked 
to sustain later charter alterations eren though 
they affect contractual rights between the corpora-
tion and its stockholders and between stockholders 
inter se. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The court then went on to sustain the validity of the 
donation in the following language at pp. 160-161: 
It seems clear to us that the public policy sup-
porting the statutory enactments under considera-
tion is far greater and the alteration of pre-existing 
rights of stockholders much lesser than in the cited 
cases sustaining various exercises of the reserve 
power. In encouraging and expressly authorizing 
reasonable charitable contributions by corpora-
tions, our State has not only joined with other 
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states in advancing the national interest but has 
also specially furthered the interests of its own 
people who must bear the burden of taxation 
resulting from increased state and federal aid 
upon default in voluntary giving. It is significant 
that in its enactments the State has not in anywise 
sought to impose any compulsory obligations or 
alter the corporate objectives. And since in our 
view the corporate power to make reasonable char-
itable contributions exists under modern condi-
tions, even apart from express statutory provision, 
its enactments simply constitute helpful and con-
firmatory declarations of such power, accompanied 
by limiting safeguards. 
In the light of all of the foregoing we have no 
hesitancy in sustaining the validity of the dona-
tion by the plaintiff. There is no suggestion that 
it was made indiscriminately or to a pet charity of 
the corporate directors in furtherance of personal 
rather than corporate ends. On the contrary, it 
was made to a preeminent institution of higher 
learning, was modest in amount and well within 
the limitations imposed by the statutory enact-
ments, and was voluntarily made in the reasonable 
belief that it would aid the public welfare and 
advance the interests of the plaintiff as a private 
corporation and as part of the community in which 
it operates. We find that it was a lawful exercise 
of the corporation's implied and incidental powers 
under common-law principles and that it came 
within the express authority of the pertinent state 
legislation. As has been indicated, there is now 
widespread belief throughout the nation that free 
and vigorous non-governmental institutions of 
learning are vital to our democracy and the system 
of free enterprise and that withdrawal of corpo-
rate authority to make such contributions within 
reasonable limits would seriously threaten their 
continuance. Corporations have come to recognize 
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this and with their enlightenment have sought in 
varying measures, as has the plaintiff by its con-
tribution, to insure and strengthen the society 
which gives them existence and the means of aid-
ing themselves and their fellow citizens. Clearly 
then, the appellants, as individual stockholders 
whose private interests rest entirely upon the well-
being of the plaintiff corporation, ought not be 
permitted to close their eyes to present-day reali-
ties and thwart the long-visioned corporate action 
in recognizing and voluntarily discharging its high 
obligations as a constituent of our modern social 
structure. 
Fifty years ago in Garey v. 1llining Co.40 this Court 
was called upon to construe the scope of the State's 
reserved power and seemed at that time to favor the 
immutable contract theory. In Garey the action was 
instituted by dissenting stockholders, who objected to an 
amendment to the charter, which had been approved by 
1najority vote in accordance with statutory authority and 
which made nonassessable full paid stock assessable and 
subject to sale. This Court held the statutory authoriza-
tion to constitute an impairment of the obligation of con-
tract, quoting from the New Jersey Zabriskie case, 
supra. 41 However, the case is to be distinguished from 
the case at bar by two important facts. In Garey, this 
Court, in the following lang·uage, held that the action 
complained of did not relate in any way to the contract 
between the state and the corporation, and did not pur-
port to be for the benefit of the public : 4 ~ 
40 32 Utah 497 (1907). 
41 Zabrislde v. The Ha.ckensack and .Sew rork Rail1·oad Com-
pany, 18 N.J. Eq. 178 (Ch. 1867). 
42 See, Note 40 supra at p. 513. 
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Bearing in mind that the corporate charter is a 
dual contract-one between the state and the cor-
poration and its stockholders, the other between 
the corporation and its stockholders-and that 
under t4e reserved power the state may alter or 
amend the former, but not the latter, the question 
is: Under which do the legislative enactment of 
1903 and the action taken by the majority of the 
stockholders falU We are of the opinion that they 
do not pertain to any right, privilege, or immunity 
which the state had granted to the corporation or 
to its stockholders, and that the action by such 
stockholders in no wise affected or was related to 
the contract existing between the state and the 
corporation. It merely pertains to and affects the 
contract existing among the stockholders them-
selves. Neither the enactment nor the stock-
holders' amendment of the articles purport to be 
for the benefit of the creditors or for the benefit of 
the public. Thereunder no right or privilege in 
favor of creditors or the public is created, and 
thereunder no creditor could assert any right or 
claim that could not have been asserted by him 
prior to the enactment. 
Moreover, the opinion distinguished cases, where stat-
utes enacted under the reserved power and imposing 
individual liability on incorporators for corporate debts 
had been sustained, on the grounds that such statutes 
pertained ''directly to the very franchise and immunity 
granted by the state, and directly relates to and affects 
the contract between the state and the corporation and 
its stockholders". 43 
In the case at bar the statutory power to donate 
similarly relates to and affects the corporation-state con-
tract. That the statute was enacted by the legislature 
43 I d. at p. 515. 
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in furtherance of the public interest is beyond dispute 
and has been amply demonstrated. 
At any rate, as hereinabove noted, New Jersey, the 
state which originated the doctrine of immutable con-
tract, has held it to be inapplicable where a statutory 
power to engage in corporate philanthropy is involved. 
An appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court 
from the New Jersey Supreme Court's determination in 
A. P. Smith, however the appeal was dismissed for the 
"want of a substantial federal question".44 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
upheld legislative amendments to corporate charters 
enacted in exercise of the reserved power over objections 
on the grounds of impairment of the obligation of the 
charter contract even where the interests of stockholders 
were more substantially affected than they are under the 
granting of a statutory power to donate. The changes 
effected by the statutes which have been reviewed by 
the Court included changed voting rights,45 repeal of the 
cLarter/6 a change in the business from cooperative and 
assessment life insurance to life insurance of every 
kind,47 a change in the liability of bank stockholders48 
and a change in the withdrawal rights of stockholders in 
a building and loan association.49 
The statutory power to donate was enacted by the 
Utah Legislature in order to encourag·e corporate giving 
by removing all doubt with respect to its legality and 
through such encouragement to promote the general 
44 346 u. s. 861 (1953). 
411 Miller v. The State, 15 Wall. 478 (U. S., 1872) and Looker 
v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46 (1900). 
46 Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881). 
47 Polk v. Mutual Reserve F'u.nd, 207 U. S. 310 (1907). 
48 Stockholders v. Sterling, 300 U. S. 175 (1937). 
49 Veiz v. Sixth Ward Assn., 310 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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welfare of citizens of the state. It is the appellants' 
position that for this reason the statutory power to 
donate may be sustained, independent of the reserved 
power, as a valid exercise of the state's police power. 
In the A. P. Smith case the lower court specifically held 
that t:ue legislation could be sustained solely as an exer-
cise of the State's police power :50 
Finally, the legislation challenged in this case 
is clearly sustainable under the police power 
reserved to and residing in each State. 'The 
police power of a state is an inherent attribute 
of its sovereignty with which it is endowed for the 
protection and general welfare of its citizens, and 
of which the state may not divest itself by con-
tracts or otherwise.' 
• • • • • 
Every person joining a chartered corporate 
enterprise does so subject to the paramount police 
power of the State. 'All contracts, whether made 
by the state itself, by municipal corporations, or 
by individuals, are subject to be interfered with, 
or otherwise affected by, subsequent statutes 
enacted in the bona fide exercise of the police 
power, and do not, by reason of the contracts 
clause of the constitution, enjoy any immunity 
from such legislation' .... 
50 A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 26 N. J. Super. 
106, 122 (1953) ; see also St. Louis, Iron Mounta1:n & Railway v. 
Paul, 173 U. S. 404 (1899); Erie RR Co. v. Wilriams, 233 U. S. 
685 (1914); Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258 (1917) and 
Home Building & L. Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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(d) The statutory grant to Utah corporations of the 
power to make donations does not violate the Due Process 
clauses of the Constitution of the United States or of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States provides, among other 
·things: 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, lib-
erty or property, without due process of law;. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution contains a 
similar prohibition. Since the .statute in question does 
no more than grant permission to corporations to make 
charitable gifts, it cannot be argued that the Legislature, 
in enacting it, has deprived any person of any property. 
Presumably the due process argument must therefore 
rest on the contention that the statute amends the cor-
porate contract and that such amendment of itself 
deprives the shareholders of a property right. In this 
guise the argument is nothing more than a reiteration of 
the argument that the statute violates the Constitutional 
prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts. 
Courts have long recognized that Constitutional objec-
tions to statutory alteration of corporate charters are 
one and the same whether framed under the Contracts 
Clause or under the Due Process Clause. Thus in Polk v. 
The Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association of New 
York51 a statute of the State of New York was attacked 
before the United States Supreme Court under both of 
said clauses. The statute in question resembled the stat-
ute here involved in that it granted additional corporate 
powers, not permitted when the original chart~rs were 
Ill 207 u.s. 310 (1907). 
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granted. The statute permitted mutual life insurance 
associations to reincorporate under new charters granting 
power to engage in various types of insurance business 
not previously permitted to such companies. The plain-
tiffs, who had become members and policy holders under 
the old charter, brought an action for dissolution of the 
company claiming that reincorporation pursuant to the 
statutory permission violated their Constitutional rights 
under the Contracts Clause and under the Due Process 
Clause. After holding that the statute did not impair the 
contractual rights of the plaintiffs, the Court said :52 
The other two questions certified inquire 
whether the law under which the reincorporation 
was made, or the reincorporation and changes in 
power made under its provisions, are in violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
of the United States. These questions do not 
require separate or detailed consideration. As 
applied to the facts of this case, they are practi-
cally dealt with in the discussion which has pre-
ceded. It is not suggested that any rights secured 
to the complainants by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were violated in any other manner than by 
the reincorporation of the Association without the 
consent of its members, the change in and addi-
tion to its powers, and the consequent effect upon 
the contract rights of the complainants and upon 
their relation to the corporation. But it has been 
shown that the contract rights of the complainant 
have not been affected by the reincorporation, and 
the same reasoning that leads to the conclusion 
that the changes in the charter powers, made under 
the reserved powers of the State, do not violate 
the contract clause of the Constitution are apt to 
show that they do not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
52 Id. at p. 327. 
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Likewise in V eix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan 
Association of N ewark53 the United States Supreme 
Court sustained a statutory alteration of corporate rights 
against the contention that the statute violated the 
Contracts Clause and then disposed of due process objec-
tions in a summary fashion. In that case the Legislature 
of New Jersey had passed a statute altering the with-
drawal rights of building and loan association certificate 
holders. A person who had become a certificate holder 
prior to the statutory change claimed Constitutional pro-
tection for his withdrawal rights as they existed prior to 
the passage of the statute. The court sustained the stat-
ute as a proper and reasonable exercise of the State's 
police power, analogous to the reserved power to amend 
corporate charters. It stated that the statute involved no 
impairment of the obligation of contracts and that sep-
arate consideration of the objection under the Due 
Process Clause was "wholly unnecessary".54 
In Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell55 
the United States Supreme Court upheld a Minnesota 
mortgage moratorium law against a contention that the 
statute constituted an impairment of the obligation of 
contracts and violated due process of law. The court in 
that case did not even find it necessary to discuss the Due 
Process Clause, contenting itself with stating that what 
was said in the opinion concerning the Contracts Clause 
"is also applicable to the contention presented under the 
Due Process Clause.' '56 
The inherent police power of the state to act with 
respect to matters concerning the welfare, including 
58 310 u. s. 32 (1940). 
54 I d. at p. 41. 
55 290 u. s. 398 (1933). 
MId. at p. 448. 
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specifically the economic and social welfare, of its citizens 
and institutions, has always been recognized. When 
measured against the requirements of due process, the 
will of the Legislature is generally upheld where the 
enactment is not arbitrary and is a reasonable response 
to the exigencies of the given situation. The United 
States Supreme Court has consistently upheld state 
legislation affecting corporations even though such legis-
lation substantially altered corporate property rights. 
Thus, a statutory requirement that railroads pay their 
employees at least semi-monthly and in cash was held not 
a deprivation of property without duo process of law.157 
A requirement that New Jersey street railway companies 
furnish free transportation to police officers on duty was 
held not a deprivation of due process.158 And a requirement 
that discharged employees be paid up to date with a per 
diem penalty for failure to do so was held not a violation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.159 Finally, in A. P. Smith 
Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, supra, state legislation 
closely paralleling the Utah legislation was held to be 
free from attack on Constitutional grounds. 
In adding to the powers of Utah corporations, the 
State Legislature has very wisely responded to a felt 
public need for corporate support of eleemosynary activi-
ties. The record in this case demonstrates that private 
eleemosynary institutions in the United States, including 
those in the State of Utah, can no longer operate effec-
tively and indeed may be in danger of complete collapse 
unless supported financially by corporate giving. The 
private resources of charitably minded individuals are, 
157 Erie RR Co. v. Williams, 233 U. S. 685 (1914). 
css Sutton v. New Jersey, 244 U. S. 258 (1917). 
159 St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Railway v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404 
(1899). 
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under current taxation, no longer sufficient for the pur-
pose. These were the circumstances under which the 
Legislature of Utah passed the enabling legislation here 
in question. To state that this well-considered and timely 
legislation infringes Constitutional guarantees is to look 
backward instead of forward and to substitute a narrow 
legalism for a broad gauge legislative policy. In deter-
mining whether the Legislature of Utah has violated the 
State and Federal Constitutions, it is not the function of 
this Court to substitute its judgment of what is good for 
the public welfare for that of the elected legislators. The 
legislative exercise must be upheld unless it is so arbi-
trary, capricious or lacking in judgment as to constitute 
a basic interference with the compact between state and 
people. This is obviously not so in the case at bar. 
I I 
The contribution represents a valid exercise by 
the appellant corporation of an implied corporate 
power. 
In Zion's Savings Bk. & Tr. Co. v. Tropic & East Fork 
lrr. Co.60 this Court held that Article XII, Section 10 of 
the Utah Constitution, which provides that "No corpora-
tion shall engage in any business other than that 
expressly authorized in its charter or articles of incor-
poration", requires that a strict interpretation be given 
to the Articles of Incorporation. However, this Court 
has aJ Ro long recognized the existence of in1plied corpo-
rate powers. In the Zion's Savings case, this Court 
quoted its dictum in Tracy Loan and Trust Co. v. lifer-
chants Bank,61 wherein it was stated that: 
ao 102 Utah 101 (1942). 
61 50 Utah 196, 202-203 (1917). 
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Implied powers of a bank or of any corporation 
for that matter are those incidental to and con-
nected with the carrying into effect or the accom-
plishing of the general purposes of the corporation 
as expressed in the object clauses of its Articles. 
In Hadlock, State Bank Commissioner v. Callister,62 
this Court stated that "a corporation may be said to 
possess such implied powers as are necessary, usual or 
incidental to its business".63 The necessity for the exer-
cise of implied or incidental powers was foreseen in 1897, 
by the framers of the original Articles of Association of 
the appellant corporation, as evidenced by the follow-
ing language of Article 8 :64 
... in exercising its corporate powers (the corpora-
tion) may do such acts as the directors may deem 
necessary or expedient not inconsistent with these 
Articles or with the Constitution and laws of the 
State of Utah. 
One of the prime duties of the board of directors of any 
corporation is, of course, to preserve, maintain, and, to the 
extent dictated by the requirements of the business, add to 
the corporate business property. It is no less the duty of 
any board of directors to preserve the existence of the cor-
poration itself. The testimony of each of the directors 
who testified in the appellants' behalf clearly indicates 
that each deems it "necessary or expedient" to embark 
on the program in issue in this case. This was succinctly 
stated, with respect to educational grants, by Mr. 
Mullendore :61i 
62 85 Utah 510,518 (1935). 
63 I d. at p. 518. 
64 Article 8 of Appellants' Articles of Association, R. follow-
ing p. 26. 
fiG Mullendore Dep., p. 7. 
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... we feel that it is just as much the obligation of 
the corporate management to use some of its 
resources in helping to educate the youth of a coun-
try and of our community in the principles and 
traditions of our free institutions, as it is to use 
our resources in the construction and maintenance 
of our physical equipment .... 
With respect to charitable contributions in the com-
munities served by plaintiff corporation, Mr. Harriman 
testified that :66 
. . . If the communities were not there, we cer-
tainly would not be able to serve them, and in a like 
manner, if they are not in a good condition, men-
tally, morally and physically, they would not be as 
good customers. We really believe the existence of 
this atmosphere of healthy environment I speak of, 
is as much of a must in the maintenance of it by our 
company as the maintenance of our physical prop-
erty, using reasonable judgment throughout. 
It is under the principle of implied powers that the 
corporate power to engage in philanthropic activities was 
first recognized by an English court. In Hutton v. West 
Cork Railway Company,61 Lord Justice Bowen by way 
of dictum made the following statement, which has since 
become a classic in the early common law on corporate 
donations: 
It seems to me you cannot say the company has 
only got power to spend the money which it is bound 
to pay according to law, otherwise the wheels of 
business would stop, nor can you say that directors 
... are always to be limited to the strictest possible 
view of what the obligations of the company are. 
Tbey are not to keep their pockets buttoned up and 
66 R. 60. 
67 23 Ch. D. 654, 672 ( 1883). 
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defy the world unless they are liable in a way which 
could be enforced at law or in equity. Most busi-
nesses require liberal dealings. The test there 
again is not whether it is bona fide, but whether, as 
well as being done bona fide, it is done within the 
ordinary scope of the company's business, and 
whether it is reasonably incidental to the carrying 
on of the company's business for the company's 
benefit. 
The dictum of the Hutton case then, justified corporate 
charity on the grounds of implied authority where the act 
performed was within the ordinary .scope of company 
business and a company benefit was reasonably incident 
thereto. This theory, long known as the direct benefit 
test, has during the twentieth century been progres-
sively relaxed. .At first, questions were raised about 
corporate pension plans68 and other matters involving 
employee relations, such as relief funds,69 hospital 
funds,70 medical care,71 health plans72 and disability 
plans.73 However in each such case the action of the 
corporation was sustained and it has now become accepted 
that such matters are within the implied powers of the 
corporation. Further expansion of the doctrine of cor-
porate benefit is found in cases holding that where a cor-
poration must rely on a particular university for its 
68 Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 Fed. 942 (8th 
Cir., 1916) and Nemser v. Aviation Corporation, 47 F. Supp. 515 
(D. Del., 1942). 
69 Beck v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 63 N.J. L. 232 (1899). 
7° Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F. 2d 798 (App. D. C., 
1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 742 (1930) and People ex rel. 
Metropol?'tan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 136 App. Div. 150 (3rd 
Dept., 1909). 
71 Bedford Belt Railway Company v. McDonald, 17 Ind. App. 
492 (1897). .. 
72 State v. Railway Co., 68 Ohio St. 9 (1903). 
78 McAdow v. Railway Co., 96 Kan. 423 (1915). 
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employees, it is within the power of the corporation to 
contribute to that university.74 
In .A. P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, supra, 
the power to make contributions was also sustained, apart 
from the statute, on common law principles. It was held 
that corporate contributions in support of academic insti-
tutions were, in the terms of the early common law rule, 
for the "benefit" of the corporation. Moreover, a new 
common law rationale was advanced to validate the dona-
tion, i. e., that of "corporate social responsibility". 
In the .A. P. Smith trial, there was testimony by the 
President of the Company, by Frank W. Abrams, Chair-
man of the Board of the Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey, and Irving S. Olds, former Chairman of the 
Board of the United States Steel Corporation, all to the 
effect that free enterprise owes its survival in some degree 
to the existence of private, independent universities and 
that corporations further their own self-interest in con-
tributing to liberal arts institutions by assuring a sup-
ply of properly trained personnel for administrative and 
other corporate employment. }.Ir. Abrams testified that 
corporations are expected to acknowledge their responsi-
bilities in support of the essential elements of a free 
enterprise system, and that it was not "good !>usiness" 
to disappoint ''this reasonable and justified public expec-
tation". He further stated that it was not right for 
corporations ''to take substantial benefits from their 
membership in the economic community while avoiding 
the normally accepted obligations of citizenship in the 
social community''. TG 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey called attention to 
the fact, amply demonstrated in the record before this 
74 Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., 285 Fed. 58 
(D. C. W. D., N. Y., 1922). 
TG 13 N.J. 9ft 145, 147-148, 98 A. 2d 581, 583 (1953). 
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Court, that individuals were able to donate freely for 
charitable purposes during the years when individual 
tax rates were much lower than at present but, with the 
transfer of wealth to corporate hands, and the increas-
ingly heavy burden of individual taxation, individuals 
have more and more turned to corporations to '' ... 
assume the modern obligations of good citizenship in 
the same manner as humans do''. 76 The court had no diffi-
culty in finding that the common law could and should 
expand to justify corporate contributions and made the 
following pronouncement in upholding the contribution 
under common law principles :77 
It seems to us that just as the conditions pre-
vailing when corporations were originally created 
required that they serve public as well as private 
interests, modern conditions require that corpora-
tions acknowledge and discharge social as well as 
private responsibilities as members of the com-
munities within which they operate. Within this 
broad concept there is no difficulty in sustaining, 
as incidental to their proper objects and in aid 
of the public welfare, the power of corporations 
to contribute corporate funds within reasonable 
limits in support of academic institutions. But 
even if we confine ourselves to the terms of the 
common law rule in its application to current con-
ditions, such expenditures may likewise readily be 
justified as being for the benefit of the corporation; 
indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed 
strictly in terms of actual survival of the corpora-
tion in a free enterprise system. The genius of 
our common law has been its capacity for growth 
and its adaptability to the needs of the times. Gen-
erally courts have accomplished the desired result 
indirectly through the molding of old forms. Occa-
16 Id. at p. 153 (586). 
11 Id. at p. 154 (586). 
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sionally they have done it directly through frank 
rejection of the old and recognition of the new. But 
whichever path the common law has taken it has 
not been found wanting as the proper tool for the 
advancement of the general good. 
The evidence, contained in the record, reveals that 
the purpose of the appellant's Board of Directors, in mak-
ing the contribution involved in this case, or in making 
contributions for the public welfare or for charitable, 
scientific, religious or educational purposes, is to enable 
the corporation and its stockholders to benefit from the 
favorable economic and social results flowing from such 
action and to assume its rightful share of the responsibil-
ities of corporate citizenship in the community. The con-
tribution thus represents a valid exercise, of a judicially 
well recognized implied corporate power. Moreover, the 
evidence indicates the extent to which the Directors of 
other corporations in the United States have reached 
similar conclusions and engaged in corporate giving. The 
record demonstrates the marked upward trend in corpo-
rate donations since 1940, as well as the average annual 
donation per corporation in terms of percentage of net 
incon1e before taxes. 78 This growth in corporate dona-
tions, resulting in an estimated total for the year 1956 
of approximately $500 million, of which $100 million went 
to support higher education, has recently been described 
as being of ''revolutionary proportions'' and yet inad-
equate when measured against educational needs.79 The 
trend is further reflected by the latest statistics from the 
Internal Revenue Service according to which corpora-
78 Watson Dep., p. 10. 
70 Buder, Colleqe Reliance on Industry Rises, New York 
Times, Jan. 13, 1957, Sec. 1, p. 1, col. 2. 
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tions in the year 1953 gave 1.24% of their net income 
before taxes to philanthropy. 80 
The passage by the Utah Legislature of the donative 
power statute is, of course, no indication that the power 
to make the contribution in issue cannot be sustained on 
common law grounds. The purpose of the Legislature 
in passing the statute was to confirm the corporate power 
to donate in broad terms so as to obviate the slow and 
painful process of individual adjudications, the alter-
nate method of developing the law governing corporate 
giving, which is not only productive of uncertainty but 
is a burden on the courts and litigants. The task of look-
ing to the decisional law for precedent is a difficult 
one because of the paucity of cases and the several fac-
tors considered by the courts in resolving each suit, viz.: 
the type of corporation, the nature of its business, the 
nature of the charity, the proposed use to which the funds 
will be appropriated and the relation of such use to the 
nature of the donor's business. The absence of clear-
cut statutory authority presents a corporation with a 
choice of either declining to discharge its responsibilities 
and failing to gain the benefits from corporate giving 
or engaging in donative activities at the risk of expensive 
litigation. These are the factors which motivate a legis-
lature to enact the statutory power to donate. 
Under the applicable decisions and the evidence sub-
mitted herein, the implied power of the appellant corpora-
tion to make the contribution in issue must be sustained 
on common law grounds as an implied corporate power 
to be exercised for the benefit of the corporation and in 
discharge of its corporate social responsibilities. 
80 Statistics of Income for 1953, Pt. 2, Preliminary Report, 
pp. 6-11 (U. S. Treasury Dept., Washington, D. C.). 
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The fact that the appellant is a Utah railroad corpo-
ration does not distinguish it from any other corporation 
with respect to its power to make donations. The issue 
of whether the contribution in question, or similar con-
tributions, may be charged to operating expense, with 
some consequent effect upon the users of the appellant's 
rail service, is irrelevant to the controversy before this 
Court, and a question to be decided by the many other 
tribunals having jurisdiction over rates.81 The sole issues 
here are whether the corporation possesses the power to 
make the contribution involved in this case, and other 
contributions for the public welfare, or for charitable, 
scientific, religious or educational purposes. 
CONCLUSION 
The declaratory judgment in favor of the defendants-
respondents entered in the District Court upon written 
findings of fact and conclusions of law should be reversed 
and declaratory judgment should be entered in favor of 
the plaintiff-appellant as prayed for in the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. E. BARNETT, 
W. R. RousE, 
CoYIXGTON HARDEE, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
~L J. BRONSON, 
WILLIAM J. McDoNALD, JR~, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant, Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 
10 South l\Iain Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
81 See, Accounting of N. Y. Telepk. Go., 188 I. C. C. 83 (1932) 
concerning the right of N. Y. Telephone Co. to charge a chari· 
table donation to operating expense. 
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APPENDIX A 
LEGISLATION CONFIRMING THE 
POWER OF CORPORATIONS TO 
ENGAGE IN PHILANTHROPY • 
.Arkansas 
Acts 1951, No. 69; Ark. Stat. 1947, 64-112 (Supp.). 
California 
Stats. 1949, C. 997; Cal. Gen. Corp. Code, Sec. 802(g) 
(Deering). 
Colorado 
Laws 1947, C. 161; Colo. Rev. Stat. 1953, Sec. 31-1-28. 
Connecticut 
L. 1953, Act 56; Conn. Gen. Stat. 1536 amended by 
1955 Supp. Sec. 2570d. 
Delaware 
Laws 1941, C. 132, as amended by Laws 1951, S. 397; 
8 Del. Code 1953, Sec. 122. 
District of Columbia 
Pub. L. No. 389, Sec. 4(m), 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 
(effective December 6, 1954). D. C. Code Ann. 1951, Sec. 
29-904 (Supp.). 
Florida 
Laws of 1955, C. 29886, Sees. 5-7; Fla. Stat. 1951, Sec. 
608.13. 
Georgia 
Laws 1953, No. 620, p. 121; Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 22-728 
(1955 Supp.). 
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Hawaii 
Laws of 1947, Act 104, Hawaii Rev. L. Sec. 8340.01. 
Illinois 
Laws 1919, p. 312, reenacted by Laws 1933, p. 310, 
amended by Laws 1949, p. 605; amended by L. 1955, p. 
1421; Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1957, C. 32, Sec. 157.5. 
Indiana 
Acts 1949, C. 194; Burns Ind. Ann. Stat. 1933, 25-11b 
(1957 Supp.). 
Kansas 
Laws 1951, C. 214, Sec.1; Kan. Gen. Stat. Sec.17-3009 
(1955 Supp.). 
Kentucky 
Acts 1952, C. 94, Sec. 1; Ky. Rev. Stat. 1953, Sec. 
271.125(13). 
Louisiana 
Laws of 1954, Act 638; 3 La. Rev. Stat. Sec. 9 :2271.1. 
Maine 
R. S. 1951, Sec. 15, C. 4; Me. Rev. Stat. 1954, Ch. 53, 
Sec. 16. 
Maryland 
Acts 1945, C. 1018 as amended by Acts 1951, C. 135; 
Flack's Md. Code Ann. 1951, Revised Art. 23, Sec. 9. 
Massachusetts 
Laws of 1953, C. 415; Mass. Gen. Stat. Ann. C. 155, 
Sec. 12c (1956 Supp.). 
Michigan 
Pub. Acts 1953, Act No. 156; Mich. Stat. Ann. Sec. 
21.10. 
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Minnesota 
.Session Laws 1949, C. 156; Minn. Rev. Stat. 1953, 
Sec. 300.66, (1956 Supp.). 
Mississippi 
- Laws 1952, C. 227; Miss. Code Ann. 1942, recompiled, 
Sec. 5325.7. 
Missouri 
Laws :Mo. 1937, p. 204 as amended by Laws ~io. 1945, 
p. 696; Vernon's M~o. Stat. Ann. Sec. 351.385. 
Nebraska 
Laws)953, L. B. 159; R. R. S. 1943, Sec. 28-1401. 
Nevada 
Laws of 1953, 0.160;·Nev. Rev. Stat.1957, Sec. 78.070. 
New Hampshire 
Laws 1953, C. 71; R. S. Ann. 1955, Sec. 294.4. 
New Jersey 
Laws 1930, C. 105 as amended Laws 1931, C. 190, 
reenacted by Laws 1949, C. 171; N. J. S. A. Sec. 14:3-13 
and Laws 1950, C. 220; N. J. S. A. Sees. 14:3-13.1, 
14:3-13.2, 14:3-13.3, 14:3-13.4. 
New Mexico 
Laws 1951, C. 105; N. M. Stat. Ann. 1953, Sec. 51-2-2. 
New York 
Laws 1941, C. 343 as amended by Laws 1951, C. 7, 
C. 388; N. Y. General Corp. Law, Sec. 34 and Laws 1946, 
C. 448, N.Y. General Corp. Law, Sec. 35. 
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North Carolina 
Session .Laws 1945, C. 775-; L. 1951, C. 1240; N. C. 
Gen. Stat. 1943, Sec. 55-26.12. 
Ohio 
108 0. L. 1245 as amended by 112 0. L. 52 and 121 
0. L. 70; Page's Ohio Rev. Gen. Code 1953, Sec. 1701.13. 
Oklahoma 
Session Laws 1949, p. 114; 18 Okla. Stat. Ann. 1951, 
Sec. 1.19. 
Oregon 
Laws 1953, 0. 549; Ore. Rev. Stat. 1953, Sec. 57.030. 
Pennsylvania 
Act of 1945, P. L. 605 as amended by Act of 1947, 
P. L. 290; 15 P. S. 2852-302(16) (1956 Supp.) and Act of 
1945, P. L. 594 as amended by Act of 1947, P. L. 288; 
15 P. S. 716 (1956 Supp.). 
Rhode Island 
P. L. 1952, C. 2919, Sec. 2. 
Tennessee 
Pub. Acts 1925, C. 59 as amended by Pub. Acts 1943, 
C. 88; Tenn. Code Ann. 1956, Sec. 48-705. 
Texas 
Laws of 1955, C. 64; Tex. Bus. Corp. Act 1955, Art. 
2.02. 
Utah 
L.1955, Ch. 22, p. 39, Sec.16-2-14(8), Utah Code Anno. 
(Pk. Pt. 1957). 
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Vermont 
Acts 1953) H. B. 82 as amended by L. 1955, Act 81, 
Sec. 1. 
Virginia 
Acts of Assembly 1954, C. 188 as amended by L. 1956, 
C. 428; Va. Stock Corp. L. 1956, Sec. 13.1-3. 
Washington 
Laws 1953, C. 213, Sec. 1-3; Wash. Rev. Code, Sec. 
23.46.010. 
West Virginia 
Acts 1949, H. B. 209; W. Va. Code 1949, Sec. 3015 ( 3). 
Wisconsin 
Laws 1951, C. 731; Wise. Stat. 1953, Sec. 180.04. 
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APPENDIX B 
September 1, 1950 
MEMORANDUM FROM THE COMMITTEE ON 
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS OF THE SEC-
TION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND 
BUSINESS LAW OF THE AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION. 
Re: Corporate Donations to Charity 
Under date of 1farch 1, 1949, the Committee recom-
mended that business corporations be empowered by 
statute to make charitable donations without regard to 
direct corporate benefit and without limitation as to 
amount. The Committee suggested that the following 
simple form be used in statutes that enumerate the gen-
eral powers of corporation: 
'' ( ) To make donations for the public wel-
fare or for charitable, scientific or educational 
purposes.'' 
and that the same form be used as a basis for a new 
section consistent with the style of other statutes that 
do not enumerate the general powers in a single section. 
At that time donations by business corporations, for 
various purposes and subject to varying limitations, 
were authorized by statutes in the States of Colorado, 
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and 'Virginia, in the 
Territory of Hawaii, and in the National Banking Act. 
Subsequently statutes of similar import were enacted by 
the States of California, Indiana, Minnesota, Oklahoma 
and West Virginia. 
It is the view of the C'Ommittee that the current corpo-
rate practice of making donations to charitable, scientific 
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and educational institutions and for the public welfare 
is supported by public opinion and seldom questioned by 
stockholders. It is also the view of the Committee that 
a statutory grant of power to legalize the practice should 
be broad in its terms, that the exercise of the power 
should be left to the discretion of corporate management, 
and that there is no logical reason for prescribing a statu-
tory yardstick for measuring the amount that can be 
donated. 
The Committee therefore renews its recommendation, 
especially for consideration at the next sessions of the 
legislatures in those States that have not yet given statu-
tory recognition to the subject. 
RAY GARRETT, Chairman............. (Chicago, Illinois) 
RICHARD F. BABCOCK, Secretary.. (Chicago, Illinois) 
GmBONS BuRKE .............................. (New Orleans, Louisiana) 
WHITNEY CAMPBELL...................... (Chicago, Illinois) 
PAuL CARRINGTON ..................... "··· (Dallas, Texas) 
JoHN SHAW FIELD........................ (Reno, Nevada) 
JoHN A. MoRRISON........................ (Kansas City, Missouri) 
WILLIAM H. NIEMAN..................... (Cincinnati, Ohio) 
KuRT F. PANTZER.......................... (Indianapolis, Indiana) 
FRANCIS T. P. PLIMPTON .............. (New York, New York) 
WILLARD P. ScoTT ......................... (New York, New York) 
GEORGE C. SEWARD ........................ (New York, New York) 
GREENBERRY SIMMONS.................. (Louisville, Kentucky) 
CHARLES W. STEADMAN................ (Cleveland, Ohio) 
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